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URL: http://www.foi.se/fusion.We construct alternative frames of discernment from input belief functions. We assume
that the core of each belief function is a subset of a so far unconstructed frame of discern-
ment. The alternative frames are constructed as different cross products of unions of differ-
ent cores. With the frames constructed the belief functions are combined for each
alternative frame. The appropriateness of each frame is evaluated in two ways: (i) we mea-
sure the aggregated uncertainty (an entropy measure) of the combined belief functions for
that frame to ﬁnd if the belief functions are interacting in interesting ways, (ii) we measure
the conﬂict in Dempster’s rule when combining the belief functions to make sure they do
not exhibit too much internal conﬂict. A small frame typically yields a small aggregated
uncertainty but a large conﬂict, and vice versa. The most appropriate frame of discernment
is that which minimizes a probabilistic sum of the conﬂict and a normalized aggregated
uncertainty of all combined belief functions for that frame of discernment.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In this article we develop a problem representation that allows us to construct possible frames of discernment from a set
of belief functions [2–6]. We assume that the core of each belief function is a subset of a so far unconstructed frame of dis-
cernment. The possible frames are constructed by partitioning the set of all cores into subsets. We continue by taking the
union of each subset and then construct the possible frames by making cross products of these unions.
Each possible frame of discernment is evaluated on how well it yields focused and speciﬁc conclusions from the combi-
nation of the available belief functions without exhibiting too much internal conﬂict.
When conﬂict is higher than measurement errors it is a sign that something is wrong. It should be noted that there is at
least two possible sources of conﬂict other than measurement errors. We may have modeling errors or faulty sources. Faulty
sources are corrected by appropriate discounting (e.g. [7–9]) while modeling errors are corrected by adopting an appropriate
frame of discernment. This article is concerned with constructing an appropriate frame of discernment. However, both ap-
proaches could be used either independently or together depending on the nature of the conﬂict. A classic modeling error
was presented by Zadeh [10] where three non-exclusive diseases: meningitis (M), concussion (C) and brain tumor (T) were
represented as atomic elements of a frame of discernment H ¼ fM;C; Tg. This is in direct violation of the requirements of a
frame of discernment to include only exclusive elements. Representing the problem with a frame likeHmeans by deﬁnition
that any patient must have exactly one disease, not zero, two or three multiple diseases. Such a modeling error can lead to. All rights reserved.
e Workshop on the Theory of Belief Function (Belief 2010) in Brest, France [1]. This work was supported
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[11] by adopting a frame of eight elements constructed as a cross product of the three elements of H, H0 = {{M,NM} 
{C,NC}  {T,NT}}, where NM, NC and NT, means no M, no C and no T, respectively. This eliminates the problem and changes
the conclusion dramatically.
Pal et al. investigated several different measures of uncertainty [12] and developed a newmeasure of average total uncer-
tainty [13]. This is now superseded by the aggregated uncertainty (AU) functional [14–16] as the best generalized measure of
both Shannon’s entropy [17] and Hartley’s [18] nonspeciﬁcity. In this article we develop a new method called frame appro-
priateness FA, where 1  FA is the probabilistic sum of the conﬂict of Dempster’s rule and AU normalized by log2jHj. This
method is used for evaluating the appropriateness of alternative frames of discernment where the AU part will be minimized
(for small frames) to ﬁnd interesting interactions among belief functions and the conﬂict part will be minimized (for large
frames) to make sure the combination of belief functions does not exhibit too much internal conﬂict. Minimizing FAwill typ-
ically yield a balance between the two parts of the measure.
The problem we are facing can thus be summarized as: we have some uncertain information about several different as-
pects of some phenomenon. We assume this information can be encoded as belief functions. However, we do not know the
frame of discernment. Instead we try to construct the frame from the cores of the belief functions at hand. Here, we do not
make any assumption that the cores are sets of atomic elements of the same frame as they may concern different aspects of
the same phenomenon. Instead we assume that they may belong to different homogeneous subframes whose cross product
is the frame representing all possibilities of the whole problem. This may however be revised whenever new information
arrives and the frame might have to be expanded to include possible outcomes not known before.
As there may be several different alternative frames at any moment in time we want to ﬁnd the most appropriate frame of
discernment. We will deﬁne appropriateness of a frame of discernment in such a way as it fulﬁlls two different aspects
simultaneously. Shafer [5, p. 280], proposed that an ideal frame should simultaneously let our evidence ‘‘interact in an inter-
esting way’’ without ‘‘exhibit too much internal conﬂict’’. We interpret ‘‘interesting’’ as having an as sharp distribution as
possible, i.e., we like to see as much mass as possible distributed on as few and small focal elements as possible. Preferably,
all mass focused on one focal element of cardinality one. The best way to measure how focused the distribution is on as few
focal elements as possible is using the generalized Shannon entropy. The best way to measure how focused the distribution
is on as small focal elements as possible is using the generalized Hartley information measure. Together they make up the
aggregated uncertainty measure (AU). Finding a frame that minimizes AU for the combined distribution is our answer to
ﬁnding the frame that best let our evidence ‘‘interact in an interesting way’’. At the same time we like the conﬂict of the com-
bination of all belief functions to be as small as possible as any conﬂict larger than measuring errors is a sign that something
(possibly the framing of the problem) is wrong. We measure the conﬂict of Dempster’s rule when combining all belief func-
tions on the frame, and like to see a conﬂict as low as possible. Finding a frame that minimizes the conﬂict is our answer to
not ‘‘exhibit too much internal conﬂict’’.
Thus, we use AU as a penalty function and seek its minimum to have sharp distributions from which we can draw inter-
esting conclusions and the conﬂict of the combination by Dempster’s rule as a penalty function and seek its minimum to
have distributions which we can trust. Finally, we want to see both considerations achieved simultaneously, i.e., both penalty
functions minimized simultaneously in such a way that if one criteria fail their combination fail. This is achieved by mini-
mizing their probabilistic sum.
Janez and Appriou [19] study methods for combining evidence represented on different homogeneous but non-exhaus-
tive partial frames of discernment. They assume an open world where knowledge of the universe of possible outcomes is
partial and where evidence from different sources may be deﬁned on frames corresponding to different subsets of all pos-
sible outcomes. They propose and investigate a series of alternative methods of managing the situation where the simplest
approach is based on deconditioning. Here, each focal element A is appended by union with all elements from other frames
that are not also included in the frame that A is represented upon, before combination is performed, i.e., focal element A on
frame Hi is substituted byA [ Hci \
[
j–i
Hj
 !
; ð1Þwhere Hj, i– j, are the other frames. When additional information is available they propose methods that yield tighter re-
sults. In addition they develop two methods without deconditioning for the case with non-disjoint frames where it is only
possible to calculate plausibilities. If evidence is known a priori to be homogeneous the deconditioning and union of frames
proposed by Janez and Appriou may be used instead of taking cross products of subframes as described in this article.
In addition some ad hoc methods based on linear combination as a method of combining evidence from different frames
without extensions of focal elements are discussed in [20].
In an article by Denœux and Yaghlane [21] the authors take an opposite approach. Instead of building a frame bottom-up
from data they assume an existing frame of discernment and seek to reduce its size by sequential coarsening of pairs of ele-
ments of the frame. Selecting which two elements that are to be combined at each step is done be minimizing information
loss. Reducing the size of the frame is done in order to improve on the computational complexity of combining mass func-
tions by using Dempster’s rule for commonalities. This approach is usually faster than direct application of Dempster’s rule.
When combining mass functions in this way it is necessary to ﬁrst transform all mass functions into commonalities by the
Construct Θ ⊕χ |Θ ⊕χ |Θ
OutputCombine
Input χ
Fig. 1. A simplistic workﬂowmodel of constructing frames of discernment and combining evidence, whereH is the frame of discernment, v is the set of all
belief functions and  is Dempster’s rule.
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Fig. 2. An iterative workﬂow model of constructing frames of discernment and combining evidence, where {Hk} is a set of alternative frames of
discernment, {mj} is a set of newly arriving additional belief functions and Happ is the most appropriate frame of discernment.
178 J. Schubert / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 176–189fast Möbius transform [22]. The computational complexity of this transformation depends exponentially on the size of the
frame. While this approach is still exponential in the smaller frame the authors show in a benchmark test that they can re-
duce the computation time to 1/2000 with 99% accuracy.
Coarsening is different from the abridgement technique used in this article. A coarsed frame is an approximation with
lower resolution of the same problem, while abridgment is a new frame for a new problem where some elements are elim-
inated from the frame. The methods described in [21] could however be used in a second step after the most appropriate
frame of discernment has been constructed to yield faster computation in case a smaller approximate frame is needed for
computational reasons.
Abellán and Moral [23] develop a newmethod for learning credal classiﬁcation trees from data that improves upon earlier
methods. While this is a different method for a different problem it has some similar characteristics with the methods devel-
oped in this article. These methods can be viewed as generalizations on Quinlan’s classic ID3 learning algorithm [24]. One
innovation is the use of a measure of total uncertainty with the usual entropy part and a nonspeciﬁcity part. They point
out that using this measure they avoid the problem of over ﬁtting data. The tree is build sequentially. If a branch is to be
added to the tree depends on the change of total uncertainty. When a branch is added it may decrease the entropy part
but increase the nonspeciﬁcity part of the total uncertainty measure. They use this measure as the stopping criterion, stop-
ping the tree growth whenever the measure cannot decrease any further. This minimization of a measure with two parts
balanced against each other (for selection between different classiﬁcation trees) is similar to the minimization of FA where
conﬂict and AU are balanced against each other (for selection between different frames of discernment).
With the methodology developed in this article we may work in a natural iterative way with the problem of frame con-
struction and the problem of belief combination and systematically evaluate different possible frames. As we receive more
evidence we will adjust our frame, possibly enlarging it from the previously one used. This changes probable reasoning from
a linear approach of frame construction followed by belief combination (Fig. 1), into an update-construct-combine-evaluate
loop approach, where we simultaneously reason about the framing of the problem at hand and the solution to this problem,
as shown in Fig. 2.
The methodology for constructing a frame for one problem (in this article) can be extended into a methodology for con-
structing multiple frames from a set of belief functions for several different subproblems [25].
In Section 2 we investigate constructing frames of discernment from incoming belief functions. In Section 3 we develop a
measure for evaluating each frame on the grounds of its dual appropriateness in facilitating interesting results from combi-
nation of all belief functions without too much internal conﬂict. This is what Shafer calls ‘‘the dual nature of probable reason-
ing’’ [5, Chapter 12]. In Section 4 we develop an algorithm for constructing an appropriate frame of discernment using the
results of the previous two sections. Finally, in Section 5 conclusions are drawn.
2. Constructing frames of discernment
Assume we have a set of evidencev ¼ fmig; ð2Þ
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The focal elements of each belief function mi contain pieces of that representation.
Our task is to ﬁnd the most appropriate frame of discernment that lets our evidence ‘‘interact in an interesting way’’ with-
out ‘‘exhibit too much internal conﬂict’’ in the words of Shafer [5, p. 280].
This will usually not be the union of all cores of mi as different cores may hold non-exclusive elements. For example, one
belief function may assign support to a focal element ‘‘Red’’ in relation to the color of a car. Another belief function may as-
sign support to a focal element ‘‘Fast’’ in relation to speed of that car. Obviously, ‘‘Red’’ and ‘‘Fast’’ are not both elements of
the frame of discernment as they are not exclusive. However, the ‘‘(Red, Fast)’’ pair might be an element of a frame.
Our task of ﬁnding the most appropriate frame of discernment becomes ﬁnding the most appropriate cross product of
different unions of cores, where each core Ci of mi is included in one of the unions exactly once.
We deﬁne the most appropriate frame of discernment as the cross product of different unions of cores that maximizes a
measure of frame appropriateness (FA), equal to one minus the probabilistic sum of the conﬂict of Dempster’s rule and a nor-
malized aggregated uncertainty (AU) of all combined belief functions.
Let us begin by introducing the representation needed to induce a frame of discernment from input data. After which, we
will give an example and demonstrate how the frame of discernment can be modiﬁed by abridgment or enlargement [5].
2.1. Representation of frames of discernment
Assume we have a set of evidence v. We observe the core Ci of each available belief functionmi. We assume that the core
of each belief function is a subset of exclusive but not exhaustive elements of a so far unconstructed frame of discernment.
2.1.1. The set of cores
Let1 TheC ¼ fCig; ð3Þ
be the set of all cores of v, where Ci is the core of mi, the ith piece of evidence.
We haveCi ¼
[
j
fAjjmiðAjÞ > 0g; ð4Þwhere Aj is a focal element of mi.
2.1.2. Partitioning the set of cores
LetX ¼ fXkg; ð5Þ
be the set of all possible set partitions of C (the set of all cores), where Xk is the kth possible partition of C. The number of
partitions of C is called a Bell number,1 BjCj, whereBn ¼
Xn1
k¼0
Bk
n 1
k
 
;
B0 ¼ 1:
ð6ÞWe haveXk ¼ fxlg; ð7Þ
where the xl’s are disjoint subsets of C, i.e.,8 l: xl#C; ð8Þ
such that[
l
xl ¼ fCig  C ð9Þandxm \xn ¼£; ð10Þ
whenever m– n.ﬁrst few Bell numbers are 1, 1, 2, 5, 15, 52, 203, 877, 4140, 21,147, 115975.
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LetHk ¼ fHkg; ð11Þ
be the set of all possible cross products relating to X, such thatHk is the cross product of all unions of elements of the par-
tition Xk, Eq. (7).
We haveHk ¼ fhlg; ð12Þ
where hl is the union of the elements in xl, xl 2Xk, and hl must be an exclusive set of elements.
We have8 l: hl ¼
[
xl ¼
[
i
fCijCi 2 xlg; ð13Þsuch that[
l
hl ¼
[
l
[
xl
n o
¼
[
i
fCig ¼
[
C; ð14Þwhere all hl’s observe two different crucial type conditions:
Type condition 1. No element of any hp may belong to any other cross product elements hq, i.e.,hp \ hq ¼£; ð15Þ
whenever p– q.
This will eliminate any frame that obviously distributes elements of the same type over different cross product elements.
It is possible to strengthen type condition 1 further by going beyond checking intersections and doing type control between
all pairs of cross product elements. This, however, is outside the scope of this article as it can not be decided within the ﬁeld
of statistics, i.e., there is no way within statistics to decide if ‘‘Fast’’ and ‘‘Red’’ are exclusive elements.
Type condition 2. Every cross product element hl must be an exclusive set, i.e.,em \ en ¼£; ð16Þ
whenever8m;n9 l: em; en 2 hl: ð17Þ
As with type condition 1, the exclusivity of hl must be veriﬁed by methods outside of statistics, and thus, outside the scope of
this article. The obvious solution to automate this veriﬁcation is to have all items in our known universe of cars classiﬁed as
to their color and speed.
We deliberately choose to cast type condition 2 in terms of exclusivity for two reasons. First, this is done to be fully con-
sistent with the exclusivity requirement of a frame of discernment when the cross product is specialized to a single cross
product element, i.e., a frame of discernment of atoms. Secondly, as with type condition 1, going one step further by asking
that all elements of each cross product element is of the same type is very difﬁcult and not within statistics. It may not even
be preferable. Describing cars as ‘Red’ or ‘Fast’ within one cross product element (or within a frame of atoms without cross
products) may be preferable if we know that there are no cars that are both ‘Red’ and ‘Fast’, i.e., the intersection between all
items of the sets labeled ‘Red’ and ‘Fast’, respectively, is empty, Red \ Fast =£.
The necessity of exclusivity among elements of the cross product elements should be noted. Without exclusivity we have
no conﬂict which is of crucial importance as the measure of frame appropriateness FA is based on a balance between conﬂict
and entropy where conﬂict tends to increase with small frames and entropy increases with large frames.
TheHk’s constructed where all hl meet exclusivity are the alternative frames of discernment. Our task is to ﬁnd the most
appropriate frame that let our evidence ‘‘interact in an interesting way’’ without ‘‘exhibit too much internal conﬂict’’. This
will be examined in Section 3.
2.2. An example
Let us assume we have three belief functions available and we want to construct all alternative frames of discernment.
2.2.1. The set of cores
The set of evidence of the three belief functions is v = {m1,m2,m3} with
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½A12;m1ðA12Þ ¼ 0:4
½A13;m1ðA13Þ ¼ 0:2g;
ð18Þwhere F1 ¼ fA11;A12;A13g is the set of focal elements of m1. Assume thatA11 ¼ fRed;Greeng;
A12 ¼ fRed;Blueg;
A13 ¼ fRedg:
ð19ÞWe ﬁnd the core of m1 using Eq. (4),C1 ¼
[
j
A1j ¼ fRed;Green;Blueg: ð20ÞFurthermore, assumem2 :
f½fFast;VeryFastg;m2ðfFast;VeryFastgÞ ¼ 0:8
½fFastg;m2ðfFastgÞ ¼ 0:2g
ð21Þandm3 :
f½fRed;Blackg;m3ðfRed;BlackgÞ ¼ 0:3
½fRedg;m3ðfRedgÞ ¼ 0:7g
ð22Þwith C2 = {Fast,VeryFast} and C3 = {Red,Black}, respectively, where C = {C1,C2,C3} is the set of all cores of v.
2.2.2. Partitioning the set of cores
The set of all cores C can be partitioned in ﬁve different ways.
We have a set of all possible partitions X = {X1,X2,X3,X4,X5} of C whereX1 ¼ fx11;x12;x13g;
X2 ¼ fx21;x22g;
X3 ¼ fx31;x32g;
X4 ¼ fx41;x42g;
X5 ¼ fx51g
ð23Þwithx11 ¼ fC1g; x12 ¼ fC2g; x13 ¼ fC3g;
x21 ¼ fC1;C2g; x22 ¼ fC3g;
x31 ¼ fC1;C3g; x32 ¼ fC2g
x41 ¼ fC2;C3g; x42 ¼ fC1g;
x51 ¼ fC1;C2;C3g:
ð24Þ2.2.3. Constructing frames from partitions of cores
From X = {Xk} we construct the set of all possible frames of discernment H = {Hk} where each Hk corresponds to Xk.
Using Eqs. (11) and (12) we obtain H = {H1,H2,H3,H4,H5} whereH1 ¼ h11  h12  h13;
H2 ¼ h21  h22;
H3 ¼ h31  h32;
H4 ¼ h41  h42;
H5 ¼ h51
ð25Þ
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h12 ¼ C2 ¼ fFast;VeryFastg;
h13 ¼ C3 ¼ fRed;Blackg;
H2 : h21 ¼ C1 [ C2 ¼ fRed;Green;Blue; Fast;VeryFastg;
h22 ¼ C3 ¼ fRed;Blackg;
H3 : h31 ¼ C1 [ C3 ¼ fRed;Green;Blue;Blackg;
h32 ¼ C2 ¼ fFast;VeryFastg;
H4 : h41 ¼ C2 [ C3 ¼ fRed;Black; Fast;VeryFastg;
h42 ¼ C1 ¼ fRed;Green;Blueg;
H5 : h51 ¼ C1 [ C2 [ C3 ¼ fRed;Green;Blue;Black; Fast;VeryFastg:
ð26ÞHowever, H1, H2 and H4 violate type condition 1, Eq. (15), and are not allowed as frames. This is determined by verifying
that some intersections between different hl’s for the same frame Hk are non-empty. For example,H1 : h11 \ h13 ¼ fRedg–£
H2 : h21 \ h22 ¼ fRedg–£
H3 : h41 \ h42 ¼ fRedg–£:
ð27ÞFurthermore,H2,H4 andH5 presumably violate the exclusivity condition of Eq. (16) and are not allowed as frames. We haveH2; h21 : 8ði ¼ 1;2;3Þ 8ðj ¼ 4;5Þ: e21i \ e21j –£
H4; h41 : 8ði ¼ 1;2Þ 8ðj ¼ 3;4Þ: e21i \ e21j –£
H5; h51 : 8ði ¼ 1;2;3;4Þ 8ðj ¼ 5;6Þ: e21i \ e21j –£:
ð28ÞFor example, e211 and e214 of h21,e211 \ e214 ¼ Red \ Fast –£; ð29Þ
are presumable non-exclusive elements and cannot both be elements of the same frame of discernment, although it may
well be that the pair ‘‘(Red, Fast)’’ is an element of a frame. That something may be both ‘‘Red’’ and ‘‘Fast’’ making these ele-
ments non-exclusive must be established by other means.
From this frame construction process only H3 comes through a possible frame of discernment. We haveH3 ¼ h31  h32 ¼
S
x31ð Þ 
S
x32ð Þ ¼
SfC1; C3gð Þ  SfC2gð Þ ¼ C1 [ C3ð Þ  ðC2Þ
¼ ðfRed;Green;Blueg [ fRed;BlackgÞ  ðfFast;VeryFastgÞ
¼ fRed;Green;Blue;Blackg  fFast;VeryFastg
¼ fðRed; FastÞ; ðRed;VeryFastÞ; ðGreen; FastÞ; ðGreen;VeryFastÞ;
ðBlue; FastÞ; ðBlue;VeryFastÞ; ðBlack; FastÞ; ðBlack;VeryFastÞg:
ð30Þ2.2.4. Reformulating belief functions given constructed frames
The one remaining thing to do is to reformulate our three belief functions given H3. We get v0 ¼ m01;m02;m03
 
withm01 :
f½A11;m1ðA11Þ ¼ 0:4
½A12;m1ðA12Þ ¼ 0:4
½A13;m1ðA13Þ ¼ 0:2g
ð31ÞwhereA11 ¼ fðRed; FastÞ; ðRed;VeryFastÞ; ðGreen; FastÞ; ðGreen;VeryFastÞg;
A12 ¼ fðRed; FastÞ; ðRed;VeryFastÞ; ðBlue; FastÞ; ðBlue;VeryFastÞg;
A13 ¼ fðRed; FastÞ; ðRed;VeryFastÞg
ð32Þand similarly for the two remaining belief functions m02 and m
0
3.
Thus, we have successfully constructed a frame of discernmentH3 from a set v of three input belief functions. Using this
frame we have reformulated the three belief functions in the terms of the adopted frame.
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For all possible frames of discernment {Hk}, where jHkj > 1, we may include further assumptions that make the frames
tighter. This may lead to more interesting interaction between the belief functions and lead to ﬁrmer conclusions provided
that the conﬂict does not increase in any signiﬁcant way. Every frame is based on assumptions. The frame we begin with is
based on the assumption that the elements of that frame are all disjunct possible alternatives, and that no other possibilities
exist. Whether a tighter or looser frame is to be preferred is a matter of appropriateness. Most often this will be a point of
balance where meaningful interaction is weighted against too much conﬂict.
Let us study one particular frame of discernmentHi from the remaining set of possible framesH that observe both type
condition 1 and 2, Eqs. (15) and (16), respectively. We haveHi ¼ fhlg: ð33Þ
For each cross product element there are j2hl j  2 possible abridgments as each cross product element hl may be replaced by
any smaller element of its own power set, except £. At least one cross product element hl must be abridged to construct a
new abridged frame of Hi. We have a set of all possible abridgments of Hi,H0i ¼ H0ij
n o
j
¼  h0lj
n on o
j
; ð34Þwhereh0lj 2 2hl ð35Þ
and 2hl is the power set of hl; h0lj –£, and 9j: h0lj – hl.
Thus, the set of all possible abridgments H0i in addition to Hi itself, are possible frames of discernment that need to be
evaluated for appropriateness.
When an abridgment is adopted as an alternative frame of discernment we must adjust all belief functions accordingly
before combination. This is a simple two step process: First, all elements that are excluded from each h0lj must be eliminated
from all focal elements of all belief functions. Secondly, if any focal element is reduced to £ its mass is redistributed pro-
portionally to the remaining focal elements. If all focal elements are reduced to £ then the abridgment is impossible.
For the jth possible abridgment H0ij of H
0
i, we havem00p Aq \H0ij
 
¼ 1
1 k m
0
pðAqÞ; Aq \H0ij –£;
m00pð£Þ ¼ 0;
ð36Þwherek ¼
X
p
m0pðAqÞ; Aq \H0ij ¼£: ð37ÞIt is also possible to deﬁne m00p without normalization, in Eq. (36). This approach will increase the ability to differentiate be-
tween different frames especially when conﬂict is absent.
2.3.1. The example
In Section 2.2 we studied an example and found a possible frame of discernmentH3 ¼ h31  h32 ¼ fRed;Green;Blue;Blackg  fFast;VeryFastg: ð38Þ
From H3 we may construct several different abridgments, where H3 may be replaced byh031 2 2h31 ð39Þ
andh032 2 2h32 ; ð40Þ
respectively, where h031; h
0
32 –£. Except that not both h
0
31 ¼ h31 and h032 ¼ h32 are allowed.
As jh31j = 4 and jh32j = 2 we have h031
   ¼ 15 and h032   ¼ 3. Thus, the number of possible abridgments to H3 is
44 ¼ h031
    h032   1 ¼ 15  3 1	 
.
When an abridged frame is adopted, all belief functions must be reformulated to eliminate those elements that do not
belong to the new frame. For example, if h31 is replaced by h
0
314 ¼ fGreen;Blue;Blackg excluding ‘‘Red’’ from h31 we must
reformulate m01 asm001 :
f½A11;m1ðA11Þ ¼ 0:5;
½A12;m1ðA12Þ ¼ 0:5g;
ð41Þwhere
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A12 ¼ fðBlue; FastÞ; ðBlue;VeryFastÞg
ð42Þand similarly for m002 and m
00
3.
2.4. Enlargement
We may make enlargements to any frame of discernment in the set of all constructed framesH = {Hk}. As the frames are
constructed from available input belief functions, using all elements that appear in those belief functions, we do not have any
further speciﬁc elements that are not already included in the frames. The only form of enlargement we can perform is to
enlarge a particular cross product element hl with an element of unstated meaning. Let us denote these elements Kl, one
for each hl.
Let us again take a look at frame Hi. We haveHi ¼ fhlg: ð43Þ
For each cross product element hl there is one possible enlargement: enlarging hl byKl. At least one cross product element hl
must be enlarged to construct a new enlarged frame of Hi. The set of all possible enlargements of Hi becomesH00i ¼ H00lj
n o
j
¼  h00lj
n on o
j
; ð44Þwhereh00lj 2 fhl0 ; hl þ fKlgg ð45Þ
and 9j  h00lj – hl. We have 2jfhlgj  1 possible enlargements of Hi, as each cross product element may or may not be enlarged.
Enlarging frames of discernment in this manner will partially remove any conﬂict within the cross product element
where Kl is included. Including Kl in every hl will eliminate all conﬂict.
Thus, the set of all possible enlargements H00i are possible frames that need to be evaluated for appropriateness.
2.4.1. The example
We return to the example of Section 2.2 and the frameH3 ¼ h31  h32 ¼ fRed;Green;Blue;Blackg  fFast;VeryFastg: ð46Þ
We may construct three different enlargements of H3, where h31 and h32 may be replaced byh0031 ¼ h31 þ fK31g ð47Þ
andh0032 ¼ h32 þ fK32g; ð48Þ
respectively. Except that not both h0031 ¼ h31 and h0032 ¼ h32 are allowed.
If, for example, h32 is replaced by h
00
321 ¼ fFast;VeryFast;K32g we must reformulate m01 asm0001 : f½A11;m1ðA11Þ ¼ 0:4
½A12;m1ðA12Þ ¼ 0:4
½A13;m1ðA13Þ ¼ 0:2g;
ð49ÞwhereA11 ¼ fðRed; FastÞ; ðRed;VeryFastÞ; ðRed;K32Þ; ðGreen; FastÞ; ðGreen;VeryFastÞ; ðGreen;K32Þg;
A12 ¼ fðRed; FastÞ; ðRed;VeryFastÞ; ðRed;K32Þ; ðBlue; FastÞ; ðBlue;VeryFastÞ; ðBlue;K32Þg;
A13 ¼ fðRed; FastÞ; ðRed;VeryFastÞ; ðRed;K32Þg
ð50Þand similarly for m0002 and m
000
3 .3. Appropriate representation
In this section we will study how to evaluate the alternative frames of discernment on the grounds of being appro-
priate for yielding interesting interactions among the available belief functions without exhibiting too much internal
conﬂict.
We will develop an overall measure of frame appropriateness FA that takes both considerations into account simulta-
neously. This measure must be a function of two other measures:
J. Schubert / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 176–189 185 one that directly measures the conﬂict in Dempster’s rule when combining the belief functions [7], to make sure they do
not exhibit too much internal conﬂict,
 another that measures the degree of interesting interaction among the belief functions by means of measuring how
focused and speciﬁc the conclusions are that may be drawn from their combination.
We prefer to see basic belief masses that are focused on as few and as small focal elements as possible. This can be mea-
sured by generalizing Shannon’s entropy [17] and Hartley’s information [18] measures, respectively. We will use a measure
of aggregated uncertainty that takes both types of uncertainty into account.
A small frame typically yields a small aggregated uncertainty but a large conﬂict, and vice versa. The most appropriate
frame of discernment is that which ﬁnds a good balance between the two measures by maximizing the frame appropriate-
ness FA.
Deﬁnition 1. LetHk be a frame of discernment and let {mj} be a set of all available belief functions deﬁned onHk. We deﬁne
a measure of frame appropriateness of Hk, denoted as FA(Hkj{mj}), byFAðHkjfmjgÞ ¼
½1 ConðfmjjHkgÞ 1 AUðfmj jHkgÞlog2 jHk j
h i
; jHkj > 1;
1 ConðfmjjHkgÞ; jHkj ¼ 1;
(
ð51Þwhere Con is the conﬂict in Dempster’s rule and AU is the functional called the aggregated uncertainty. We have Con 2 [0,1],
AU 2 [0, log2jHkj] and FA 2 [0,1].
The measure of frame appropriateness FA is identical to one minus the probabilistic sum of conﬂict and normalized aggre-
gated uncertainty.
The aggregated uncertainty functional AU is deﬁned asAUðBelÞ ¼ max
fpxgx2H

X
x2H
pðxÞlog2pðxÞ
( )
; ð52Þwhere {px}x2H is the set of all probability distributions such that px 2 [0,1] for all x 2H,X
x2H
pðxÞ ¼ 1 ð53ÞFig. 3. An algorithm for generating and evaluating appropriate frames of discernment.
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pðxÞ ð54Þfor all A # H. AU was independently discovered by several authors about the same time [14–16]. For a recent overview, see
[26].
Abellán et al. [27] suggested that AU could be disaggregated in separate measures of nonspeciﬁcity and scattering that
generalize Hartley information [18] and Shannon entropy [17], respectively. Dubois and Prade [28] deﬁned such a measure
of nonspeciﬁcity asIðmÞ ¼
X
A2F
mlog2jAj; ð55Þwhere F #2H is the set of focal elements. From Eqs. (52) and (55) we may deﬁne a generalized Shannon entropy [27] asGSðmÞ ¼ AUðmÞ  IðmÞ: ð56Þ
Disaggregation of AU into measures of nonspeciﬁcity and scattering is further discussed in a recent article by Bronevich and
Klir [29]. They formulate axioms for uncertainty measures and extend measures of aggregated uncertainty to imprecise
probabilities.
An algorithm for computing AU was initially found by Meyerowitz et al. [30]. This algorithm has a computational time
complexity of O(2jHj) (see also [31] for implementation). Liu et al. [32] later developed the F-algorithm for calculating AU
in order to reduce time complexity. Recently their presentation of the F-algorithm was corrected and further improved upon
by Huynh and Nakamori (see Algorithm 3. The improved F-algorithm in [33, p. 208]). This improved F-algorithm restricts
calculations to the unions of focal elements UðFÞ, where F is the set of focal elements. This step of the algorithm includes the
leading term of the computational time complexity. From jUðFÞj#2H they conclude thatce of evidence m1: Measures of frame appropriateness (FA), conﬂict and aggregated uncertainty (AU), do. normalized, generalized Shannon entropy (GS)
eralized Hartley information (GH) for H1 (last row) and its six possible abridgements. R = ‘Red’, G = ‘Green’, B = ‘Blue’.
e of discernment Hk FA Conﬂict AU AUlog2 jHk j
GS GH
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
} 0.029 0 0.971 0.971 0.571 0.4
} 0.029 0 0.971 0.971 0.571 0.4
} 0 0 1 1 1 0
,B} 0 0 1.585 1 0.785 0.8
ces of evidence m1 and m2: Measures of frame appropriateness (FA), conﬂict and aggregated uncertainty (AU), do. normalized, generalized Shannon
(GS) and generalized Hartley information (GH) for H1 (last row) and its 20 possible abridgements. R = ‘Red’, G = ‘Green’, B = ‘Blue’, F = ‘Fast’,
ryFast’.
e of discernment Hk FA Conﬂict AU AUlog2 jHk j
GS GH
{F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
{VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
{F,VF} 0 0 1 1 0.2 0.8
{F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
{VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
{F,VF} 0 0 1 1 0.2 0.8
{F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
{VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
{F,VF} 0 0 1 1 0.2 0.8
}  {F} 0.029 0 0.971 0.971 0.571 0.4
}  {VF} 0.029 0 0.971 0.971 0.571 0.4
}  {F,VF} 0.014 0 1.971 0.986 0.771 1.2
}  {F} 0.029 0 0.971 0.971 0.571 0.4
}  {VF} 0.029 0 0.971 0.971 0.571 0.4
}  {F,VF} 0.014 0 1.971 0.986 0.771 1.2
}  {F} 0 0 1 1 1 0
}  {VF} 0 0 1 1 1 0
}  {F,VF} 0 0 2 1 1.2 0.8
,B}  {F} 0 0 1.585 1 0.785 0.8
,B}  {VF} 0 0 1.585 1 0.785 0.8
,B}  {F,VF} 0 0 2.585 1 0.985 1.6
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which yields an improvement upon [30,32].4. An algorithm for constructing an appropriate frame of discernment
Using the results of the preceding sections we develop an algorithm for constructing and evaluating all possible frames of
discernment. This algorithm will ﬁrst generate the possible frames using different partitions of the set of all cores (Step 1–3),
Fig. 3. In Step 1 we generate the set of all cores {Ci} from the belief functions. In Step 2 we generate the set of all partitions
{Xk} of {Ci}. In Step 3 we use {Xk} to generate the set of all possible cross products {Hk}. From these possible frames we gen-
erate abridgments (Step 4) and enlargements (Step 5). The frames are evaluated using the measure of frame appropriateness
FA, Eq. (51) (Step 6). From the output of the algorithm the most appropriate frame that maximizes FA may be selected.
The frames of discernment H0ij
n o
generated in step four may be generated recursively as long as all super sets have a con-
ﬂict less than one.
Brute force implementation of FA has a computational time complexity of O(jvjjvj2jHj). Implementing steps 2–4 in an iter-
ative way may reduce the term jvjjvj of the time complexity.ieces of evidence m1, m2 and m3: Measures of frame appropriateness (FA), conﬂict and aggregated uncertainty (AU), do. normalized, generalized
n entropy (GS) and generalized Hartley information (GH) forH3 (last row) and its 44 possible abridgements. R = ‘Red’, G = ‘Green’, B = ‘Blue’, Bl = ‘Black’,
’, VF = ‘VeryFast’.
e of discernment Hk FA Conﬂict AU AUlog2 jHk j
GS GH
{F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
{VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
{F,VF} 0 0 1 1 0.2 0.8
{F} 0 1 0 0 0 0
{VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
{F,VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
{F} 0 1 0 0 0 0
{VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
{F,VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
 {F} 0 1 0 0 0 0
 {VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
 {F,VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
}  {F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
}  {VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
}  {F,VF} 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.2 0.8
}  {F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
}  {VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
}  {F,VF} 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.2 0.8
1}  {F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
1}  {VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
1}  {F,VF} 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.2 0.8
}  {F} 0 1 0 0 0 0
}  {VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
}  {F,VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
1}  {F} 0 1 0 0 0 0
1}  {VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
1}  {F,VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
1}  {F} 0 1 0 0 0 0
1}  {VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
1}  {F,VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
,B}  {F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
,B}  {VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
,B}  {F,VF} 0.613 0 1 0.387 0.2 0.8
,B1}  {F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
,B1}  {VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
,B1}  {F,VF} 0.613 0 1 0.387 0.2 0.8
,B1}  {F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
,B1}  {VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
,B1}  {F,VF} 0.613 0 1 0.387 0.2 0.8
,B1}  {F} 0 1 0 0 0 0
,B1}  {VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
,B1}  {F,VF} 0 1 0 0 0 0
,B,B1}  {F} 1 0 0 0 0 0
,B,B1}  {VF} 1 0 0 0 0 0
,B,B1}  {F,VF} 0.667 0 1 0.333 0.2 0.8
188 J. Schubert / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 176–189If more belief functions arrive over time we must update the set of belief functions vt+1 = vt [ {mj} with the new belief
functions {mj}, Fig. 2, and recompute the evaluation of frame appropriateness, Fig. 3.4.1. Revisit the example
Let us revisit the example and study the sequential process of frame construction as the ﬁrst three pieces of evidence
arrives.
Initially we have m1, a piece of evidence about color. From this piece of evidence we can only construct one frame
H1 = {R,G,B} and its six possible abridgments, see Table 1.
With only one piece of evidence there is never any conﬂict, thus the minimization of entropy will favor frames of cardi-
nality one. One possible extension is not normalizing the mass functions when some focal elements are eliminated entirely.
This would introduce an internal conﬂict. If this approach was taken we would have a conﬂict forH01 ¼ fGg andH01 ¼ fBg and
would favor H01 ¼ fRg.
When the second piece of evidence m2 arrives we have focal elements that are non-exclusive forcing us to adopt a frame
that is a cross product of the cores. It is here possible to construct two initial frames but only oneH1 abide type condition 2.
There are 20 possible abridgments to H1. As the combination of m1 and m2 are conﬂict free there will be no enlargements,
see Table 2.
We notice six alternative frames of discernment with maximum frame appropriateness at this stage.
Finally, let us study the situation after the arrival ofm3. It is possible to abridgeH3 to a singleton subset {(Red,Fast)} with
a frame appropriateness of 1 and support from the three belief functions of 1. There are also three possible frames with car-
dinality two, three frames with cardinality three and one frame with cardinality four, all of them with frame appropriateness
of 1. These eight frames are all equally appropriate as they are all both conﬂict and entropy free, i.e., yielding maximal inter-
esting interaction without any internal conﬂict. The other 37 possible frames all have a frame appropriateness of less than 1,
see Table 3. As this example is conﬂict free for H3 no enlargements of H3 are generated in step 5 of Fig. 3.
It is obvious from Table 3 that small frames are favored as long as AU and the conﬂict do not grow. This is because AU is
normalized to the interval [0,1] by the logarithm of the size of the frame (log2jHkj). In particular, as long as all focal elements
in the combination of all belief function share a common element forH3, the frame can be reduced to that element as both
conﬂict and entropy are zero for a singleton frame.
While the initial frameH3 = {R,G,B,B1}  {F,VF} is acceptable with FA = 0.667 it can be improved upon in several differ-
ent ways, mainly by removing ‘VeryFast’ from the second cross product element. The frames of discernment with FA = 1 are
the eight cross products of the (non-proper) subsets to the ﬁrst cross product element that all contain ‘Red’. In our case, all
eight frames with FA = 1 yields the same result, i.e., m123({(Red,Fast)}) = 1. This can be compared withH3 where the sup-
port from the combination of the three belief functions is split among two focal elements {(Red,Fast), (Red,VeryFast)}. Thus, a
more focused result is achieved by the frames with FA = 1.5. Conclusions
We have developed a problem representation with which we can construct possible frames of discernment from incom-
ing belief functions. These frames of discernment can be evaluated by a measure of frame appropriateness given the avail-
able evidence. Each frame is evaluated as to how well it yields interesting interaction among the available belief functions
without exhibiting too much internal conﬂict.
With this methodology we are able to automate or semi-automate the most important part of probable reasoning: con-
structing the frame of discernment.References
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